Based upon the premise that an accurately targeted decision to proceed or not with a recompletion or sidetrack job in an oil field may not be possible without further information, this paper investigates what worth is brought to resolving such decision uncertainty by acquiring new data, and relates the cost of such data to changes the data bring about in the worth of going ahead with a development job. Limitations to the costs of such data, and of undertaking further studies should the acquired data not resolve the situation, are examined in relation to the estimated worth of the development project and also to the probability that a successful profitable outcome for the development project will prevail. Given the uncertainties on such future estimates, an investigation is also given of the dominance of individual uncertain factors in contributing to the uncertainty of turning a profit. Five examples are given, designed to illuminate how the costs and uncertainties influence, sometimes very seriously, prior estimates of likely worth of the development project. Detailed considerations show which of the costs and uncertainties need to be lowered or better constrained if such a project is to be undertaken rather than abandoned because of the excessive costs involved that convert a very worthwhile project into one that can only lose even more money for a corporation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The economic investigations in previous papers in this series have been geared to providing assessments of the worth of undertaking a recompletion job or a sidetrack development based on whether the sidetrack (or recompletion) is worthwhile and on when one should undertake the job during the lifetime of a producing field. The aim was to produce an awareness of the uncertainties in future estimated parameter values and their influence on the ranges of uncertainty for assessments of the worth of going ahead with a recompletion or sidetrack.
But, as decision-makers struggle with the available information in their attempts to recommend a go/no-go order, it can happen that the uncertainties are just so large that no meaningful evaluation can be given on the basis of the information and future projections available. Under such conditions, the decision-makers would be reluctant to recommend an undertaking but they would be equally reluctant to recommend no undertaking; they just do not have enough accurate information to be confident of any decision they would make. So rather than recommend either for or against a recompletion or sidetrack, the decision-makers opt for a third alternative, which is to collect more data prior to a definitive decision being reached. The sort of data needed may range from seismic 3D survey to better modelling of pressure flow through already producing wells to new slim-line boreholes to collect spot information about reservoir quality. But such data do not come without an associated cost of collection and interpretation; furthermore the data so collected may not resolve either positively or negatively the ambiguity and uncertainty that existed before the decision was reached to obtain the data. As a consequence, the decision-makers may end up no better off than they were prior to getting the data. One of the problems is that new data collection can inform only concerning the reservoir attributes, and does nothing for future financial assessments, which remain an unknown. Collecting more data adds value to a potential decision to proceed or not only when the data expense is limited to less than the anticipated improvement in understanding. The improvement may be of two sorts: either the new data resolve positively in favour of undertaking the recompletion/sidetrack job, or they resolve negatively against the undertaking; but if the new data cost is too high then, while the resolution may be positive, the cost of the data drives the worth negative -leading to a decision against the undertaking. Thus there must be a limiting data cost (the value of the data) if one can afford to proceed. Equally, if the resolution is negative, so that one would not proceed with the job, nevertheless if the data cost is too high then it may have been cheaper to go ahead anyway with the sidetrack/recompletion job without spending money on new data because the cost would be less -and there is always the serendipity factor that one might obtain more product by so doing than one would have estimated before undertaking the job. So in this case, too, one would argue for a limit on expenditure for the value added by new data.
The purpose of this paper in the series is to show how one can handle such uncertainties on the worth of collecting new information to help guide or improve decisions. The dominant vehicle we use to provide such an evaluation is the Excel spreadsheet code illustrated in the Appendix to this paper, and the associated decisiontree diagram of figure A1 in the Appendix..
II. UNCERTAINTIES AND VALUE OF NEW INFORMATION
In order to focus attention on the factors associated with the value that may be added by acquiring new data, the first block of parameter values in the Excel spreadsheet code of the Appendix, labelled "Base case parameters without added information", provide the assessment of the total value obtained to date from a producing field, together with estimates of future gains and costs (which themselves require models of anticipated inflation and selling price of product with time, as shown in an earlier paper in this series), and also the probabilities that the future estimates of gains and costs will occur. This sort of information sets the basis for the next stage of development of the worth of acquiring new data that, in the spreadsheet code of the Appendix, is given in the box labelled "Parameters for Case with Added Information". There are several concerns expressed in that box, and these concerns are also clear in the decision-tree diagram of figure A1. First there is the cost of acquiring the information; then there is the probability that the new information will resolve the decision to undertake or not the recompletion/sidetrack job; if it does resolve the situation then there is the probability that a decision to proceed will lead to a financial success and the future costs and gains expected to be realized from such a success; there is also the probability that a decision to proceed will lead to a financial failure and the costs involved in that failure. If the new information does not resolve the situation then the decision-makers can decide to abandon the attempt (at some cost of abandonment) or to continue. If the decision is made to continue, despite irresolution of the situation with new information, then further studies could be done at some cost in the hope that they will resolve once and for all the uncertainty. Such extra studies will also incur costs. And then, as a result of such extra studies, the decision-makers again have two possibilities to consider: to finally abandon or to continue; abandonment will again incur costs while continuance will lead to a chance of a successful job with associated gains and costs estimated, and a chance of failure, again with costs estimated.
The overall pattern is geared to sequential decisions based on costs and gains estimated at each stage and the value returned to the corporation by undertaking (or not undertaking) the recompletion/sidetrack. The difficulty is, of course, that all the projected probabilities of success and failure, and all the various costs and gains, are future estimates, so that there is uncertainty on what or how well any such new information would do in helping the corporation make a profit. One item is, however, clear: if the costs of acquiring the new information far outstrip the anticipated gains based on use of the new data, or if the costs far outstrip just going ahead with the job and taking the estimated loss if it is unsuccessful, then in either eventuality there is little point in acquiring new data. The same remark applies to the costs of extra studies done later in attempts to resolve an uncertain situation one way or another.
Because of the large number of parameters entering the calculation of the value added by acquiring additional information, and because these parameters are not known precisely ahead of the final determination of the project and the tally of total gains and costs, it is exceedingly difficult to be exact about the worth of spending a given budget on new information acquisition -one just does not have sufficient knowledge to be sure in any circumstance. Accordingly, in this paper two major prongs of discussion are given.
First, a deterministic set of illustrations are provided to show, for each set of parameters chosen (with no uncertainty allowed for the parameter values), how varying the cost of acquisition of new information influences the worth of the resulting chances of a sidetrack/recompletion being more profitable than not undertaking the job. These calculations are given because they are usually the first that need to be undertaken to provide some idea of how much money should be expended, at a maximum, in order to reach a first-pass at the decision to be followed. One cannot just evaluate the expected value along the lower branch of the decision-tree of figure A1 and compare it with the expected value along the upper branch, as has occasionally been done in the past. The reason is, of course, that expected values on their own contain no information of the uncertainty (risk) of the expected value -the point here is that expected value is not one of the outcomes of the decision-tree but rather represents the average behaviour if one had an infinite number of trials possible, something that just does not occur in reality.
Information on the standard error of the expected value, or some other factor measuring statistical sharpness of worth, is needed in order to assess the risk of each expected value. This particular point has also been made more directly elsewhere (Lerche and McKay, 1999) . So we will generate such measures of worth and risk and show how they can be used to assess the cost of acquiring new information for specific and deterministic illustrations. We will also do the same for fixed costs of acquiring new data but also allowing the costs of further studies (to resolve unclear situations) to vary. In this way a compendium of case histories can be built to show how these tools of risk assessment operate in the context of new information and /or further studies costs relative to the decision to proceed or not with a sidetrack/recompletion job.
Second, armed with the patterns of results for the deterministic cases, we then turn our attention to the parameter values themselves. Because they are not perfectly known, there is uncertainty attached to the estimate of worth of a decision to go ahead, which is dependent on the actual values used for the parameters. A simple way to investigate the influence of parameter uncertainties on the outcome of the different branches of the decision-tree is to use a Crystal Ball type of approach and so compute the relative contribution of each uncertain parameter to the outcome uncertainty. In this way one obtains knowledge of how sensitive each output is to each parameter and so one can focus attention on those parameters causing the greatest uncertainty and spend effort (and often money) in attempts to narrow their ranges of uncertainty if so desired. This procedure is far superior, in terms of time involved and money spent, than just attempting to narrow the range of uncertainty of all parameters, including those that provide but little uncertainty on output values. One must then tie the uncertainty caused by fluctuations in parameters to the intrinsic uncertainty caused by path outcome values and so determine which is causing the dominant risk. This aspect of such problems has been developed in previous papers in this series and so will be used directly here with just minor explanation as needed.
III. DETERMINISTIC ILLUSTRATIONS
Here we consider two different illustrations of patterns of behaviour and associated costs for new data. The first illustration takes the position that there is no unresolved uncertainty after one acquires new information. The main aim of this illustration is to show how the results for a decision depend on the cost of the new information relative to the other parameters in the system. The second illustration takes the costs of the new data acquisition to be given but now allows an unresolved component. This model asks how the results for a decision are influenced by the costs of further studies and also by the probability to abandon the exercise of a sidetrack or recompletion based on the results and costs already in place, and so to go ahead without undertaking such a costly job.
Costs of New Information
The parameters for each of the five case histories illustrated are given as Tables in the Appendix to the paper so that one can see immediately how the various contributions to each case have been modified relative to the previous case history; in this way a direct comparison is immediately available with out the need to spell out in detail each an every alteration in the body of the paper. Table 1 of the Appendix shows parameter values for the first case history, in which the probability of an additional study is remote and in which the successful results of additional information yield a value for the study much in excess of the base case history. This choice of a high value to a successful information gathering has been chosen to emphasize the dynamic range of values for information costs and gains relative to the base case.
To be noted here is that the assumptions of an extremely high probability (90%) that a decision to proceed will lead to a success of $90MM implies that the amount that can be spent on information gathering and processing can be a significant fraction of the expected gains. This point is reinforced when one also takes into account the anticipated costs for a successful venture (estimated at $20MM). A rough estimate of the success worth is then about $(90x0.9-20) MM=$61MM, suggesting that up to some reasonable fraction of this amount could be spent on new data. Figure 1 shows the cumulative probability that the worth of the situation with added information will exceed the worth without the date collection as a function of the costs Figure 1 . Cumulative probability that the value of the development project with data acquisition exceeds the base case value as a function of the costs of the data for parameters for Case History 1 given in Table 1 of the Appendix of acquiring the data; figure 2 shows the P50 value with data collection as a function of the cost of the data. Both the figures emphasize the point that at the values chosen for potential success probability and the worth of a success, one can afford to spend nearly $50MM before one would raise serious concerns about the costs of the additional data and its interpretation in relation to the anticipated value added to the project by the data costs. Indeed, figure 3 shows a plot of the costs of the data in relation to the value added to the project by the data. Note that at high data costs there is little to no value added to the project (basically because any anticipated gains are eaten up by the high data costs) but as the costs of the data are reduced then a significant increase in the worth of the project ensues until, if one can obtain the added information for nothing, then one maximizes the value brought to the project at about $40MM. The point of using such extreme ranges of values is so that one can see immediately where the dominance of individual factors lies without them being buried in amongst other, roughly comparable, factors which would make an illustration of effects less than transparent.
Costs of Additional Information and Further Studies
The second exercise, with detailed parameter values given in Table 2 of the Appendix, shows an example where one can readily over abuse the anticipated worth of the project, on the grounds of " more is better". Thus in this case the costs of the additional Figure 2 . P50 worth of the development project as a function of the costs of acquiring new data, for Case History 1 with parameters as given in Table1 of the Appendix information are taken at $40MM, but now there is significant chance (80%) that if the situation is not resolved by the additional data collection and interpretation, then the decision-makers are prepared to spend an additional $32MM on further studies to help resolve the problem. Note that, at this stage, a total of $72MM is being committed -$40MM for the additional data and $32MM for the further studies. Remembering that the anticipated successful gains minus costs had only an average value of $61MM, and has a maximum value of $(90-20) MM =$70MM, it would seem that corporate greed has driven the situation to one of virtually no chance of making any profit whatsoever.
This abuse of what could have been a very worthwhile situation to the corporation is one of the problems that often occur when one is virtually certain of a considerable profit, even with high additional costs of data, but then one ruins the situation completely by authorizing yet another considerable expenditure in order to resolve a small unclear component -indeed for the example given here it may have made a lot more sense just to drill the unresolved issue at considerably less expense than the further studies are costing. These points are emphasized pictorially in figures 4 and 5, which display different aspects of the same ruination of what could have been a very worthwhile development opportunity.
Thus figure 4 shows the ENPV of the development as the costs of the further study rise (for a fixed costs of $40MM for the additional data study), indicating that the ENPV goes strongly negative above a cost of a few million dollars, in agreement with the general sense of the argument presented here. Figure 5 displays a different aspect Figure 3. Cost of acquired data versus value such data brings to the development project, for Case History 1 with parameters as given in Table 1 of the Appendix Figure 4 . ENPV of the development project including costs of further study, plotted as a function of the further study costs for Case History 2 with parameters as given in Table 2 of the Appendix Figure 5 . Comparison of the ENPV values for a further study development when one includes the cost of the further study charges but goes ahead without using the study results versus the ENPV when one incorporates the chances of success suggested by the study. Both are plotted against the costs of the study, and refer to Case History 2 with parameters as given in Table 2 of the Appendix of the same over abuse problem. The two curves mark the ENPV if one were to pay for both the cost of the additional data and the costs of the further study, but the top curve shows the worth of the ENPV if thereafter one were not to go further with the further study costs, while the bottom curve shows that if one were to follow through on completing the development in the light of the further studies, then the costs in total, with the probabilities and other fixed parameters given in Table 2 , so swamp the chances of ever making a profit that one continues to drive the expected returns ever more negative. The point of this example is to urge frugal caution. Granted, one has to spend some money to evaluate the worth of a development, but spending a goodly fraction of the total potential profit (which is itself uncertain) for the costs of additional data, and then compounding this hefty charge by a second goodly fraction on further studies, means that one has been fiscally irresponsible. There just is no room left to manoeuvre when the total costs effectively are very close to maximum potential gains, so that it is exceedingly unlikely that one can make any profit at all even if the potential gains of the development project really do transpire, something that rarely occurs in reality, which compounds the already low chance of making any profit at all.
IV. UNCERTAINTY AND VOLATILITY CONSIDERATIONS 3. Uncertainty Estimates
The two illustrations given above use determined, precise values for the parameters involved in assessing the improvement in worth brought about by the additional data. But the costs of the data are unknown prior to actually expending the amount and, indeed, the anticipated gains to be most likely realized from the additional data interpretation are themselves a matter of guesswork rather than being hard facts. This difficulty has often led corporate decision-makers to enhance their ideas of perceived potential gains, and so to provide a justification for expending large sums on additional data purchases, with a very rude surprise often once one goes ahead based on such inflated and non-justifiable estimates.
Following on from the procedures developed in previous papers of this series (Lerche and Noeth, 2001 a, b, c, d, e ), here we investigate the consequences of allowing uncertainty in the parameters to see which factors are causing the greatest uncertainty in the estimates for the development project. The corresponding variations of six parameters are depicted in the Appendix (Table 3) for this case history, namely: the estimated gains if the additional data bring success, the costs of additional information purchase, the estimated costs if the project is indeed successful, the costs if the project fails, and the costs of abandonment -although these abandonment costs are usually so small compared to other costs involved that they rarely make a significant contribution to either ENPV or to uncertainty of the ENPV. For the ranges of each of the six parameters used, the reader is referred to the Appendix. The distribution choices from which the parameters are chosen are also shown in the Appendix.
One should, in principle, also vary the choice of the distributions to allow for that uncertainty too, but here we concentrate solely on the parameter induced uncertainty and ignore both the distribution choice uncertainty component and also the path variation uncertainty -although in a more realistic situation than this simple example is designed to portray all three of the uncertainty contributions should be looked at in detail to see which of them dominates. This point has been investigated in some detail in previous papers in the series and there is no need to repeat it here.
This case history is essentially a repeat of Case History 1 above with no further studies and for the same parameters as for Case History 1, except for the six that are allowed to vary as shown. Thus one is examining the extent to which uncertainty in the outputs is influenced by the large potential swings of uncertainty of the inputs. The method used to examine this aspect is again a Crystal Ball approach with Monte Carlo suites of trials being run and recorded. Shown in figure 6 are the relative contributions to the uncertainty of the ENPV because of the ranges of the parameters. As expected, the abandonment costs and the failure costs are so small (even when allowed to be at the maxima of their ranges chosen in the Appendix) that they contribute but little to the total uncertainty of the ENPV. The three dominant contributions to uncertainty are the expected gains, the costs of additional data and the estimated costs if the development were to be successful. This strong dependence is not too surprising because in absolute magnitude those three components are massively larger than all other factors involved.
Because of the large spread in the dominant three parameters, the ENPV (with purchase of additional information) is much reduced compared to the deterministic situation of Case History 1, returning now a value of just $12.7MM, only slightly larger than the base case of $12.5MM. In addition the absolute uncertainty on the ENPV is now large at $12.2MM, so that the volatility (standard error divided by mean value) is 1.04, indicating that little trust should be placed in the ENPV as a reliable except those allowed to vary as depicted in Table 3 of the Appendix indicator of the value of going ahead with the development project. This point is again underscored pictorially in figure 7, where the cumulative probability that the development worth with the purchase of additional information exceeds the EPNV without purchase is depicted, showing a roughly 50% chance of a positive outcome. Or again, as shown in figure 8 , the ENPV curve indicates little is to be gained by paying the large purchase price for additional data. Clearly, in order to narrow the range of uncertainty of the expected worth of the development project, some serious attention must be given to cutting down the uncertainties in the anticipated gains, the costs of additional data, and the anticipated costs of a successful development project, if there is to be any hope that the development will be undertaken with a reasonable assurance of profit for the corporation. The alternatives are either to forgo the development because of the high and very uncertain costs and gains involved, or to just go ahead and drill without paying out the exorbitant costs for new data -this latter option may be more cost effective than the alternative high costs of data acquisition.
The point of this example has been to show that when costs and anticipated gains are high, but also when their uncertainties are equally as high, then what appeared to be a good development situation, can have attached to it such a large uncertainty that one really learns very little for the extra expenditure involved. Thus, one has to decide whether, under such circumstances, it makes any sense at all to go ahead with data purchase or just to go ahead and drill and take a random chance. With an ENPV not too different from the base case, but with a very large volatility (and one due solely to parameter uncertainties with path outcome uncertainties boosting the volatility even further) there is little to be gained unless the magnitude and range of estimated gains, Figure 7 . Cumulative probability that the development worth will be greater with the acquisition costs than without, for the range of parameter values depicted in Table 3 of the Appendix and for Case History 3 of the text estimated additional data costs, and costs of development if successful, can all be made more precise and, in the case of data and development costs, the values also lowered in magnitude.
Figure 8.
Cumulative probability for the ENPV of Case History 3 after allowing for acquisition costs using the uncertainties of the parameters given in Table 3 of the Appendix Figure 9 . Results of undertaking a further study to resolve uncertain issues for the development project, showing how the ENPV is influenced as the costs of the further study increase, for parameters for Case History 4 as recorded in Table 4 of the Appendix
Further Study Costs and Effects on Profitability
The purpose of this deterministic example is to show how sensitive the decision to continue or not with a development project can be depending on the already committed costs of additional information in relation to the resolution achieved by such additional data acquisition. As shown in Table 4 of the Appendix, the costs of additional information are held fixed at the low value (compared to the previous examples) of $10MM, but the chance the data will resolve the unclear situation is lowered to 50%, while the chance that one will choose to continue with a further studies component to the development project in the light of the irresolution is also set at just 50%. Thus the worth of continuing with the development -even if it does have an estimate of $90MM gains if successful -is lowered because the ENPV is also considerably lower than in the previous cases. This point will be seen in a moment. The cost of the further studies under the deterministic conditions of Table 3 is then systematically increased and three visualizations of the impact on the worth of the further studies are presented. First, as shown in Figure 9 , the ENPV (after the fixed costs of additional information and study charges) is plotted as a function of increasing study charges, showing that the low value of about $5MM at zero cost for the study charges is systematically driven lower as the costs of the study increase, crossing zero at about $4MM for the study charges. Thus a small change in study costs is enough to drive a development project with limited expected worth to a negative value.
In this particular case one should also keep in mind that the base case study has an ENPV worth of $12.5MM, so that one has already spent too much on the fixed additional costs (at $10MM) to make the development project worthwhile. This point Figure 10 . Plot of P10, P50 and P90 values for Case History 4 with parameter values as given in Table 4 of the Appendix showing that unless one is extremely optimistic (as depicted by P90) then even a small cost for further study charges will drive the worth of the development project negative is emphasized by plotting the P10, P50 And P90 values for the development project against the increasing costs for the further studies, as shown in figure 10 . All three of these indicators of worth show that the worth of proceeding is unlikely to lead to a profit. Indeed, even in the aggressive case of taking the P90 value as a marker of enthusiastic advocacy for the project, by a cost of $8MM for the further studies even this indicator is driving the worth potential negative. If one sits with the more conservative P50 or P10 values as appropriate indicators of worth, then they both argue for little to zero expenditure. Thus there is just too much money being squandered on additional costs and then further studies for too little gain potential. Figure 11 shows the probability that the worth of the development project after the study will be greater than without the study (and both the before and after cases involve the additional costs of $10MM for the additional data acquisition), showing that there is a region of further study costs where the probability exceeds 50% (just as there was for the P90 and P50 values shown in figure 10 ), but this region rapidly diminishes as the costs of the further study rise. Once more, while one can indeed have a region where one could argue for the further studies costs, the problem remains that there has already been too large an expenditure on the additional data costs, which has lowered the expected worth below the base case worth of $12.5MM, indicating the fundamental problem lies earlier in decisions to proceed with the high data acquisition cost. But once that prior commitment is made, small changes in further studies costs have an enormous sensitivity to the chances of turning a profit with the development project. The parameters in Table 3 were chosen for this case history specifically to allow emphasis of this point. Figure 11 . Plot of the cumulative probability that the value of the development project with the extra costs of the further study will exceed the worth without such costs, plotted against the study costs for Case History 4 with parameters as given in Table 4 of the Appendix
Uncertainties in Further Studies Parameters
Finally in this compendium of illustrations illustrating how costs of acquiring further data in order to resolve development uncertainties influence the bottom line on profitability of a potential development, we consider the situation of the previous case history but allow the costs for the further study to be uncertain and to range from $5-22MM, the probability one would abandon further involvement in the project as a result of the further study results to vary between 10-30%, and the probability of a successful undertaking based on the results of the further study to vary between 60-90%. These parameters and their ranges and distribution choices are shown in Table 5 of the Appendix.
Here we consider only the importance of these choices and ranges on the uncertainty of the final worth anticipated for the development project. Not included are path outcome uncertainty effects or uncertainty effects due to choices of different distributions from which one draws particular parameter values for a suite of Monte Carlo studies; both of these components would add to the basic uncertainty and should be included in a complete investigation as has been shown elsewhere (Lerche and Noeth, 2001 d) .
A standard method of assessing the components bringing the greatest uncertainty to the ENPV is then to use a Crystal Ball approach and so compute the relative contributions to the variance of the ENPV after further study costs. Figure 12 presents such a plot showing that, for the three parameters chosen to be uncertain and with their ranges of uncertainty as given, it is the costs of the further study that contribute most (at 61%) to the uncertainty on the ENPV, with the probability of a successful Table 5 of the Appendix. Other fixed parameters are as for Case History 4 above development after the costs of the study contributing a distant second at about 25%. The ENPV in this case takes on a negative value of -$6.37MM and has a standard error due to parameter uncertainty effects alone of $4.59MM, suggesting that not only is undertaking the development not a good idea, but that the uncertainty on the ENPV is so large (a volatility of 75%) as to make the use of the ENPV highly suspect as an accurate measure of the worth of the development project. Again the two factors killing the project are the high costs paid for the acquisition of more data ($10MM) and the high value of the further study costs to be paid (between $5-22MM). Without narrowing the range of uncertainty of the further study costs one is forced to live with the uncertainty on the negative ENPV, and without lowering both the acquisition costs and the further study costs then there is little chance of making the development project profitable anyway. It is these two factors that the design of this illustration has been geared to exemplify.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The basic aim of this paper has been to show how the value added by acquiring new data to resolve clarity in a development project, prior to taking a commitment decision for such a project, can influence adversely or positively the worth of going ahead with the project. It is not the case that the costs of acquiring data or undertaking further studies are to be belittled, but rather that the costs of such endeavours in relation to anticipated gains need to be kept firmly under control. Perhaps the two quintessential points to make are: that all future anticipated gains are just that -anticipated -and so to commit a considerable fraction of the anticipated gains on data acquisition or further studies to prove out such gains can undermine the very worth of such putative gains; that all estimates of potential successes and potential resolution of unclear issues with the data acquired or further studies are just that -estimates -and so one has to provide some rational reason for the probability values one chooses to use to justify the additional costs. The problem here is that there can well be a desire on the part of individuals in a corporation either to enhance or to denigrate a particular development project in a non-objective manner. Such situations make it difficult for decision-makers to assess objectively whether an accurate measure of potential benefit to the corporation has been adequately addressed.
The advantage to the procedural methods spelled out here for both the deterministic and the stochastic illustrations is that they provide reproducible, quantitative measures of what each assumption and range of estimates brings to help in resolving issuesand they also spell out where more effort needs to be placed to control the dominant factors either contributing directly to the worth of a development project or in contributing to the uncertainty of the worth. Both factors need to be considered simultaneously, as exemplified here with the five different case history illustrations.
In addition, one cannot look only at a single measure of worth (such as say the ENPV) because it does not contain any information on its own uncertainty. Likewise one cannot look only at the relative contributions of particular factors to the uncertainty of, say, the ENPV because they contain no information on the absolute value of the standard error of ENPV. All such measures must be addressed simultaneously in order to obtain an appropriate perception of resolution, stability and uncertainty of potential value for a development project. One must also consider the uncertainties due to path outcome chances and due to distributions from which the uncertain parameter ranges are chosen. Failure to include these components can lead to a very misleading perception of where dominance of uncertainty lies.
One further factor also usually needs to be addressed as well, which is the development with time and associated inflation costs and selling price of product costs and how they influence the overall perception of project worth. All of these factors have been addressed in earlier papers in this series and the methods displayed there can be taken over almost wholesale to the problem of value added by acquisition and further studies costs should the need arise. We have not included them here because then the central points we wished to make would have been obscured and also because we would then have had a very long paper indeed, and one which would not achieve the limited goals we were striving for to bring awareness to the totality of worth and its uncertainty caused by decisions to acquire more data and/or to undertake further studies.
APPENDIX
This appendix consist of a set of tables that provide the parameter values used in the various Excel spreadsheet codes for the five different case histories of the text. There are three deterministic spreadsheets used with different case histories, and two Crystal Ball report spreadsheets that show the ranges and distribution choices for each of a suite of uncertain parameters also used in the text case histories. Figure A1 . Decision-tree diagram illustrating the way costs for acquired data and further studies enter into the overall pattern for a development project 
